

The Function of θυμός in Hesiod and the Greek Lyric Poets

By SHIRLEY DARBUS SULLIVAN, Univ. of British Columbia
(Canada)*)

Hesiod and the Greek lyric poets often mention θυμός in their poems. The prominence of this psychic entity among them is not surprising since Homer had frequently spoken of θυμός to which he ascribes a very wide range of activities.¹⁾ The precise identity of θυμός in Homer may continue to be a mystery,²⁾ but of its function as man's chief psychic entity there can be no question. In Homer person and θυμός remain always distinct but their relationship changes: θυμός serves as a location within a person, acts in subordination to, in harmony with, or in opposition to him. Hesiod and the lyric poets reveal a similarly varied relationship between person and θυμός but they differ from Homer in some respects.³⁾ In particular, θυμός emerges as an agent with greater

*) I express my appreciation to the Canada Council for the Research Grant that allowed me to work on this article in Oxford.

¹⁾ Homer refers to θυμός more than 700 times. See S. D. Sullivan, "How a Person Relates to θυμός in Homer", forthcoming in *Indogermanische Forschungen* 85 (1980).

²⁾ For some interpretations of its identity see: E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*⁴ (Paris 1938) 356–357; H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960) vol. 1, 693–694; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* (Paris 1968) vol. 2, 446. Cf. E. Bičkel, *Homerischer Seelenglaube* (Berlin 1926) 260ff.; J. Böhme, *Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos* (Leipzig and Berlin 1929) 20–23; R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*² (Cambridge 1954) 47, 80; E. L. Harrison, "Notes on Homeric Psychology", *Phoenix* 14 (1960) 65; A. W. H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One* (Ithaca, N. Y. 1970) 16.

³⁾ This article concentrates on the relationship of person and θυμός revealed by analysis of grammatical usage. The nature and function of θυμός in Hesiod and the lyric poets has received far less attention than it has in Homer. The following works are pertinent; E. Lobel, *ΑΛΚΑΙΟΥ ΜΕΛΗ* (Oxford 1927) xxxvii; D. J. Furley, "The Early History of the Concept of the Soul", *BICS* 3 (1956) 3ff., H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*² (Munich 1962) 85ff., V. N. Jarcho, "Zum Menschenbild der nachhomerischen Dichtung", *Philologus* 122 (1968) 166–172; B. Snell, *Tyrtaios und die Sprache des Epos* (Göttingen 1969) *Hypomnemata* 22; Adkins (note 2) 16ff.; O. M. Saveljeva, "The Value of the Word

independence in the person; he must cope with the activity of *θυμός* and sometimes resist it.

The following account will treat all instances of *θυμός* found in Hesiod and the lyric poets, classifying them by usage and examining their function.⁴⁾ In my discussion of Homer,⁵⁾ the large number of instances of *θυμός* made it necessary for some categories to represent a number of occurrences; the present study will examine each occurrence separately. Despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence for these poets, analysis of the passages and some general conclusions appear feasible.⁶⁾

I. *Θυμός as Location*

Θυμός acts as a location of various activities. Twice it is found with the preposition *ἐκ* (Hes., fr. 58.4; Theog. 62). In some passages a person carries on the following activities *ἐν θυμῷ*: *βάλλω* (Hes., *W. & D.* 297; Theog. 1050): *φράζω* (Theog. 99 = 1164c); *φυλάσσω* (Hes., *W & D.* 491). One can crush (*πιέζω*) anger *ἐν θυμῷ* (Pind., *Ol.* 6.37); many evils come to be there (*γίγνομαι*: Mim. 2.11); songs place charm there (*τίθημι*: Pind., *Pyth.* 3.64).⁷⁾ Similarly *θυμός* functions as a location when it is found in the accusative after the prepositions: *κατά* and *πρός*.⁸⁾

Θυμός is the specific location of the effect of some object on a person in two passages in which a double-dative construction

θυμός in Archaic Lyric Poetry (Non-choral)", *VKF* 6 (1976) 197–208 (in Russian); S. M. Darcus, "Thumos and Psyche in Heraclitus B 85", *RSC* 25 (1977) 354–359.

⁴⁾ With the exception of those mentioned in note 14.

⁵⁾ See note 1.

⁶⁾ Fragments of the different poets are numbered according to the following editions: *Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum*, ed. F. Solmsen (Oxford 1970); *Fragmenta Hesiodica*, ed. R. Merkelbach and M. L. West (Oxford 1967); *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, ed. E. Diehl, fasc. 1 (Leipzig 1951), fasc. 3 (Leipzig 1952) = (D) [For poets not treated in West]; *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, ed. M. L. West (Oxford 1971), 2 volumes = (W); *Poetae Melici Graeci*, ed. D. L. Page (Oxford 1962); *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis*, ed. D. L. Page (Oxford 1974) = (S); *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*, ed. E. Lobel and D. L. Page (Oxford 1955) [For Sappho and Alcaeus]; *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis*, ed. B. Snell (Leipzig 1964), Parts I and II; *Bacchylidis Carmina cum Fragmentis*, post B. Snell ed. H. Maehler (Leipzig 1970). See also below note 14.

⁷⁾ I accept West's reading of *θύμω* for *θυμῷ* in Hipponax 10.1.

⁸⁾ *κατά*: Hes., *W. & D.* 58; 358; fr. 204.42; fr. 209.1; fr. 278.1; fr. 198.5. *πρός*: Alc. 129.22; Anacr. 97 D (= W. eleg. 1).

appears. The *κρόεν μάντευμα* comes to Pelias (*οἱ θυμῶ* (Pind., *Pyth.* 4.73). Theognis wishes that a course of action would become dear to the gods (*σφιν θυμῶ* (733).

Four other passages, where different uses of the dative appear, also suggest *θυμός* as a location. In Hes., fr. 25.20 *θυμός* is locative, appearing with the verb *άάομαι*. In Hes., *W. & D.* 366, it is possessive: *πῆμα θυμῶ*. In Hes., *W. & D.* 499, *θυμῶ* is the indirect object: *προσελέξατο θυμῶ*. So too in Theognis 1325: *θυμός* receives *μέτρο' ἠβης*.

Another construction suggests *θυμός* as a location. When used as the accusative of part, *θυμός* is cited as the specific portion of a person affected. Anger comes to Zeus in his *θυμός* (Hes., *Theog.* 554). Prometheus stings (*δάκνω*) Zeus in his *θυμός* (Hes., *Theog.* 567). Hesiod advises Perses not to let *ἔρις* hinder him in his *θυμός* from work (*W. & D.* 28). Theognis asks not to be stirred up (*ὀρίνω*) in his *θυμός* (1295). In each instance person and *θυμός* are mentioned separately but within the person *θυμός* seems in particular the location of his reactions.

II. *Θυμός* as Both Location and Possible Participant

Θυμός acts not simply as a location of activity but also as a possible participant in that activity. Instances of the comitative-instrumental dative suggest this: a person acts not only in but also with his *θυμός*. This construction occurs with two verbs that express intellectual activity: *γιννώσκω* (*Theog.* 1305) and *οἶδα* (*Theog.* 1247). It appears as well in expression in which *θυμός* is involved in emotion. A person can have *ἀνίη* or *πένθος θυμῶ* (Hes., *Theog.* 612, 98). Zeus grieves (*ἀχέω*) *θυμῶ* (Hes., *Theog.* 368). Similarly one guards *ἀλγεα θυμῶ* (Hes., *W. & D.* 797) and steals away *δεῖμα θυμῶ* (Pind., *Pyth.* 4.96). So too, one can be angry *θυμῶ* (*ὀδύσσομαι, σπέρχω*: Hes., *Theog.* 617; Pind., *Nem.* 1.40). A person also performs a wide range of other activities in, by, or with *θυμός*. In six passages the activity of *ἐθέλω* takes place *θυμῶ*.⁹⁾ Men desire to achieve *μεγάλαν ἀρετὰν θυμῶ* (Pind., *Ol.* 8.6). Likewise a man can try to come to the height of excellence *θυμῶ* (Tyr. 12.44). Verbs meaning "destroy", "fight", "perform", "possess", "receive", "see", and "speak" also occur with the dative *θυμῶ*.¹⁰⁾

⁹⁾ Hes., *Theog.* 443; 446; fr. 204.54; Sapph. 1.18; 5.3; Pind., *Is.* 6.43.

¹⁰⁾ *ἀναιρέω*: *Theog.* 1125; *μάχομαι*: Tyr. 10.13; *κάννω*: Pind., *Ol.* 2.8; *ῥέζω*: Pind., *Pyth.* 9.96; *κτάομαι*: *Theog.* 199; *δέχομαι*: Hes., fr. 43(a)25; *ῥάσσομαι*: Hes., *Theog.* 551; *παράφημι*: Pind., *Nem.* 5.31.

That *θυμός* functions both as a location of activity and a participant in it is suggested by a second construction: the accusative of respect. In two cases this construction occurs with verbs expressing distress: *ἀχεύω* (*Adesp.* 924.7) and *ἄχνημαι* (Pind., *Is.* 8.5 a). In another passage, a person feels disgusted in respect to *θυμός* (*ἀσάω*: *Theog.* 989). In contrast, a person can be delighted *θυμόν* (*τέρπομαι*: Pind., *Pyth.* 2.74). Theognis says that someone lying (*κεῖμαι*) in great helplessness in respect to *θυμός* would find few guardians as faithful friends (646). Pindar describes Melissos as similar (*εἶκω*) in *θυμός* to the daring of lions (*Is.* 4.46). Elsewhere he describes men who become *πινυτοὶ θυμόν* (*Is.* 8.25 a). In all these instances an activity is experienced specifically in respect to *θυμός* which may, as with the comitative-instrumental dative, take part in it. *Θυμός* seems subordinate to the person but shares in his activity.

The participation of *θυμός* in a person's activity may also be suggested by two instances of a dative of manner. Hesiod says: *δασσάμενος μέγαν βοῦν πρόφρονι θυμῷ* (*Theog.* 536). Pindar uses this dative in *Pyth.* 4.181: *θυμῷ γελαεῖ*.

III. *Θυμός as Affected from Without*

Θυμός functions as an object affected by outside influences, other persons, or the gods. This aspect of *θυμός* is revealed partly by passages where it appears with verbs in the passive voice. Hesiod twice says that *θυμός* is increased (*ἀέξω*: *Theog.* 641 and fr. 317). Bacchylides refers to a *θυμός* that is not "bent back" (*ἀνακάμπτω*: 17.82). In addition it occurs when *θυμός* is the object of some verb, either in the genitive, dative, or accusative case. It is found in the genitive with the verb *ἀποσφάλλω* when Solon is deprived of both *θυμός* and *φρένες* (33.4). It occurs too in the dative when "spring sailing" fails to please (*χαρίζομαι*) *θυμός* (Hes., *W. & D.* 683) or when *ὄργή* does please it (*Theog.* 1224).

But this aspect of *θυμός* is found most often in instances of the accusative after a verb. First, different objects or influences can directly affect *θυμός*. In one passage, Theognis says that it is *ἀμηχανίη* that leads *θυμός* astray into *ἀμπλακίη* (386–387); in another, he says that *ἦβη* and *νεότης* do this (629–630). In one passage Pindar says that the *ἀστῶν ἀκοά* in particular burdens *θυμός* (*βαρύνω*: *Pyth.* 1.84). In another, he says that "the wave rolling near the base of the ship" especially throws *θυμός* into confusion (*δονέω*: *Nem.* 6.57). Bacchylides, on the other hand, describes *κου-*

φόταται μέριμναι as having this effect on *θυμός* (*δονέω*: 1.179). Finally, Bacchylides says that during a drinking-party, *γλυκεῖ ἀνάγκα* warms *θυμός* (*θάλλω*: fr. 20 B 7).

In other passages a person's *θυμός* can be affected by the gods or other persons. A god can affect *θυμός* with these verbs: *δάμνω* (Sapph. 1.4); *ἐντύω* (Pind., *Nem.* 9.37); *οἶδα* (Theog. 375); *ὀρίνω* (Hes., fr. 51.3); and *πτόημι* (Alc. 283.4). A person influences another's *θυμός* with these verbs: *αὔξάνω* (Pind., *Nem.* 3.58); *ἄφαιρέω* (Ibyc. S 222.6–7); *ἔχω* (Sim. 141.3 D); *ιαίνω* (Pind., *Ol.* 7.43); *θανμάζω* (Pind., *Pyth.* 9.30); *πείθω* (Hes., fr. 22.8; Prax. 748); and *πέυθομαι* (Mim. 14.1). All these instances show *θυμός* within a person open to the influence of outside agents.

IV. *θυμός* as Affected by a Person

Θυμός functions likewise as an object which the person himself can affect. One can please (*χαρίζομαι*) his *θυμός* (Bacch. fr. 20 B 20), put joy (*χάρις*) in it (Theog. 1321: *ἐντίθημι*) or simply *ταῦτα* there (Hes., *W. & D.* 27: *ἐνικατατίθημι*). Certain verbs suggest the control a person has over *θυμός*. In particular in many passages a person "has" (*ἔχω*)¹¹ *θυμός* which can display varying characteristics; e.g., it can be *ἀκηδής*, *εὐφρων*, *κρατερόφρων*, *μάργος*, *σώφρων*.¹² In other passages *θυμός* is object of verbs having the root meaning of "to place": *τίθημι* (Hes., fr. 204.95; Arch. 23.10; 98.16); *ἐντίθημι* (Theog. 966); *κατατίθημι* (Theog. 983); *παρατίθημι* (Tyr. 12.18). Other verbs likewise illustrate the effect a person can have on *θυμός*: *ποιέω* (*μέγαν καὶ ἄλκιμον*: Tyr. 10.17); *ἐπιτρέπω* (Alc. 335.1); *τρέπω* (Hes., *W. & D.* 315; 646; Anacr. 375); *εἴργω* (Hes., *W. & D.* 335); *τελέω* (Theog. 1160).

Some verbs imply a specific influence someone can have upon his *θυμός*. Certain suggest situations of joy or grief: *βαρβιτίζω* (Pind., fr. 124d1); *γελανόω* (Bacch. 5.80); *εὐφραίνω* (Stesich. S 148 i 9; Pind., *Is.* 7.2; Bacch. 3.83); *ιαίνω* (Theog. 1122); *ἀχεύω* (Hes., *W. & D.* 399).

¹¹ Epithets: Hes., *Theog.* 61; *W. & D.* 112; 170 (all three: *ἀκηδής*); *W. & D.* 147 (*κρατερόφρων*); *W. & D.* 340 (*ἴλαος*); *Theog.* 833 (*ἀναιδής*); Tyr. 5.5 (*ταλασίφρων*); Call. 1.1 (*ἄλκιμος*); Sol. 13.28 (*ἀλιτρός*); Alc. 129.10 (*εὐνοος*); Theog. 61 (*δόμοφρων*); 754 (*σώφρων*); 765 (*εὐφρων*); 1301 (*μάργος* and *ἀγήνωρ*); Sim. 8.7 (*κοῦφος*); Bacch. fr. 11.2 (*ἀπενθής*). No epithet: Hes., *W. & D.* 13; 445; *Theog.* 239; Tyr. 13; Sem. 1.24; Theog. 384; 444 = 1162d; 748; 910; Bacch. 1.143.

¹² For the significance of *-φρων* epithets of *θυμός* see S. M. Darcus, "phrōn Epithets of *Thumos*", *Glotta* 55 (1977) 178–182.

In other passages one can cherish (*ἀμφέπω*: Pind., *Nem.* 7.10; 7.91); guide (*κυβερνάω*: Bacch. 17.23); satisfy (*ὑποκορέννυμι*: Theog. 1158); or suspend *θυμός* (*ἀνακρίμνημαι*: Pind., *Paean.* 8.79). A person can also adorn (*ἀγλαίζω*: Sem. 7.70), increase (*αὔξάνω*: Bacch. 10.45), shame (*αἰσχύνω*: Pind., *Nem.* 9.27), or soften *θυμός* (*μαλάσσω*: *Adesp. Iamb.* 35.17). Someone can also surrender *θυμός* to youth (*ἐκδίδωμι*: Pind., *Pyth.* 4.295). The verb *αἰτιάω* (Alc. 358.2) suggests some opposition between a person's choice of activity and that of *θυμός*. Finally, at death, a person can breathe forth (*ἀποπνεύω*: Tyr. 10.24) or lose (*ἄλλωμι*: Tyr. 12.23) *θυμός*.

V. *Θυμός as an Active Agent*

Θυμός functions also as an active agent within a person. In one passage its activity is described as less valuable than that of *νόος*: *ὥτινι μὴ θυμοῦ κρέσσων νόος* (Theog. 631). *Θυμός* often exerts control over the person himself. In some passages the nominative of *θυμός* appears with verbs in the active voice. Some verbs reveal *θυμός* "ordering", "urging on", or "stirring up": *ἀνώγω* (Hes., *Theog.* 549; Theog. 999); *ἰθύνω* (Arch. S 478[a]3); *κελεύω* (Hes., *Theog.* 645; fr. 75.14); *ὀρμάω* (Pind., *Ol.* 3.25); and *ὀτρύνω* (Pind., *Ol.* 3.38). *Θυμός* also sends (*ἀνίημι*) someone to betroth a wife (Hes., fr. 200.7). It desires (*ἰμέρω*) the completion of certain things (Sapph. 1.27). It endures to sing (*τλάω*: Theog. 826). *Θυμός* can suffer painfully (*ἔχω ἀργαλέως*) concerning love (Theog. 1091). Finally one passage may say that *θυμός* trusts love (*πείθω*: Alc. 283.9).

The nominative of *θυμός* also appears with verbs in the middle voice. *Θυμός* desires: *ἐέλδομαι* (Hes., *W. & D.* 381) and *λιλαίομαι* (Hes., *Theog.* 665). It hopes: *ἔλπομαι* (*Par. Ox.* 2316.2). It is envious: *ἀγαίομαι* (Hes., fr. 211.4). Along with *νόος* it flutters: *πέτομαι* (Theog. 1053). It is Heracles' wish that his son's *θυμός* follow his own (*ἔπομαι*: Pind., *Is.* 6.49).

In several passages in the lyric poets, a person addresses *θυμός* in the vocative. This usage does not occur in Homer or Hesiod. It suggests that *θυμός* acts independently within the person, perhaps to a greater degree than in either Homer or Hesiod. Archilochus gives advice to *θυμός*, warning it to adapt its reaction to joy and grief in light of the *ῥυσμός* that holds men (128.1). In a fragment Ibycus addresses *θυμός* directly, apparently comparing its action to that of a *τανόπτερος πορφύρις* (317[b]). In the long poem ascribed to Theognis *θυμός* occurs five times in the vocative. Once Theognis

urges it to turn to all people a *ποικίλον ἦθος* (213). In another passage he laments that he cannot provide all things pleasing to it (695). In a third passage he tells *θυμός* to be full of youth (*ἠβάω*: 877), in a fourth, to take courage (*τολμάω*: 1029), and in a fifth, to rejoice (*τέρπω*: 1070a).

Pindar addresses *θυμός* four times. Once he tells *θυμός* that according to the opportune time it ought to *ἐρώτων δρέπεσθαι σὺν ἀλικίᾳ* (fr. 123.1). Similarly in wishing for love to occur opportunely he tells *θυμός* not to pursue *πρεσβυτέραν ἀριθμοῦ πράξειν* (fr. 127.4). In another passage he urges *θυμός* to hold its bow to the mark (*Ol.* 2.89). In a fourth passage Pindar asks *θυμός* to which *ἀλλαδαπὰν ἄκραν* it is changing his *πλόον* (*Nem.* 3.26).

All these passages in the vocative reveal *θυμός* as an agent within the person, one involved in grief, joy, courage, and love. It is changeable entity whose *ἦθος* can alter to suit the people it encounters (*Theog.* 213). A person can fail to please *θυμός* (*Theog.* 695). It can alter a person's attention (*Pind.*, *Nem.* 3.26). In all cases person and *θυμός* remain distinct with each capable of strongly influencing the other.

VI. *Θυμός as Qualified Entity*

Occasionally *θυμός* is an entity qualified by certain characteristics. Seven times it is found with a copulative verb. Hesiod describes a *θυμός* that is *μάργος* (*πέλομαι*: fr. 239.2). Archilochus says that *θυμός* is for men (*ἐστί* understood) as the day which Zeus brings (131.1). Sappho mentions a *θυμός* that is *ψυχρός* (*γίγνομαι*: 42.1). Alcaeus says that there exists for him a *θυμός* to sing (*ἐστί* understood: 308.2). Theognis refers to a *θυμός* that is not *ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ* (1256). Pindar speaks of a *θυμός* being *ἄτολμος* (*έών*: *Nem.* 11.32). Bacchylides mentions that a *θυμός* *εὐμενής* is present (*πάρεστι*: fr. 21.3).¹³) These passages suggest *θυμός* as the location of specific qualities which can affect the person's behaviour.¹⁴)

¹³) Cf. also the epithets of *θυμός* after the verb *έχω*: see note 11.

¹⁴) The following fragments are not included in the above discussion because they are too fragmentary or the context is unclear: Hes., fr. 75.23; fr. 212(b)2; Arch. 89.14; 89.24; Sapph., fr. 4.1; fr. 60.5; fr. 86.4; S 476.5; Alc. 34.3; fr. 58.19; 6.18; 41.14; Corinna 654 (a) col. iv. 37; Pind., fr. 60a2 *Pae.* 13b15; fr. 336.1; *Pap. Ox.* 2442 fr. 105.2; Bacch. 13.220; fr. 20 E 21; *Adesp. Iamb.* 14.5; *Adesp.* 924.1.

VII. *Conclusions from the Evidence*

The instances in which *θυμός* appears in Hesiod and the lyric poets suggest a varied relationship between a person and this psychic entity. First, *θυμός* functions as a location in which a person performs emotional, intellectual, and volitional activities. In such passages *θυμός* seems to be subordinate to the person, acting as the location where he performs these activities. It is also a location specifically affected by outside influences. The reaction of *θυμός* also affects the person's behaviour.

Secondly, *θυμός* acts not merely as a location of a person's activity but also as a means and accompaniment which he uses or with which he acts. These passages suggest that *θυμός* could act in coöperation with a person.

Thirdly, *θυμός* is an entity directly affected by outside influences, other people, or the person himself. In some passages helplessness, cares, or necessity can affect *θυμός*. In others, gods can conquer, know, or stir up *θυμός*. Other people also can increase, remove, delight, or persuade *θυμός*. In yet other passages—and most frequently—a person exerts influence over his own *θυμός*. In particular a person "has" a *θυμός* displaying different characteristics. It is also an entity a person can place, turn, restrain, delight, guide, cherish, or increase. In all these passages *θυμός* seems subordinate to outside forces or to the person himself. *θυμός* may be able to offer opposition to the person, requiring him to exercise control over it.

Finally, and most importantly, *θυμός* functions as an independent agent within a person. Although this was a prominent role of *θυμός* in Homer,¹⁵⁾ it seems enhanced in the lyric poets by the appearance of the vocative case. By now a person can directly address his *θυμός* which seems capable of more independent activity and perhaps of greater opposition to the person himself. Archilochus warns *θυμός*; Theognis urges it to experience various emotions; in one passage Pindar urges *θυμός* to follow a course of action; in another he inquires where it is leading him. Although in Hesiod and the lyric poets *θυμός* in the nominative case displays a less wide range of activity than in Homer (and here the fragmentary nature of the evidence may give a distorted impression), these instances of the vocative suggest that it has become even more than before an independent agent within the person, one which

¹⁵⁾ See Sullivan (note 1).

he must attend closely. This greater independence of *θυμός* may also explain why there are so many passages where a person exerts control over his own *θυμός*: as it becomes more active, the person must attempt to control it more.¹⁶⁾

Although *θυμός* does not appear in Hesiod and the lyric poets to be as prominent a psychic entity as it was in Homer (and once again the fragmentary evidence may be misleading), it nonetheless functions with a wide range of activities in a person. *Θυμός* can act independently, being capable of determining someone's behaviour and causing him on occasion to resist its activity. *Θυμός* can act in subordination to someone, in harmony with him, or in opposition to him. In the lyric poets, to an even greater degree than in Homer or Hesiod, person and *θυμός* emerge as distinct entities, each independent though bound in a close and varying relationship.

'eat' in Greek

By ERIC P. HAMP, Chicago

1. The infinitive *ἔδμεναι* and the Greek future *ἔδομαι* make perfect Indo-European equations. We must then ask why we find such presents as *ἔσθω Il.+* and *ἔσθίω Od.+*. The answer is not far to seek if we consider all the relevant facts.

We now know that the Indo-European root 'eat' began with a laryngeal: **H_{ed}-*. Chantraine *Formation* 315 called *ἀλφηστῆς* 'bread eater' and *ὠμηστῆς* 'carnassier' "degré long". But we now may credit the Greek long vowel to the fusion with **H_e*; the following sigma results from **d* before dental. A similar explanation is to be given for *δελπνηστος* (*Formation* 303), and for the same reason we may suppose that *ἄριστον* originally (or always?) had *ī*. We are now ready to reconstruct the present of **H_{ed}-*, an athematic:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} *H_{ed}-mi & > & *ἔδμι \\ -si & > & ἔτσι \\ & & \text{ἔσ(σ)ι} \end{array}$$

¹⁶⁾ Cf. the way *φρήν* likewise emerges as a more independent agent in the lyric poets than in Homer or Hesiod. See S. M. Darcus, "A Person's Relation to *φρήν* in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets", *Glotta* 57 (1979) 159-173. See also Snell's discussion of *θυμός* (note 3).